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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
PUBLIC UTILITIZS-FRANCHISz RATmS AS Ap scT. BY TnZ WORLD WAR.-
The economic convulsions due to the World War are abundantly reflected
in the relations between the public and their public utilities operating under
franchises fixing rates for service. The enormous rise in cost of labor and
materials has, in many cases, so reduced the net income of such utilities as
to make it a negative quantity at existing franchise rates. The utilities are
crying to be saved from bankruptcy, but the unfortunate suspicion bred by
past dealings of many such companies has made the public skeptical, and
perhaps in many cases entirely unreasonable. In some cases plain selfish-
ness may explain the attitude on both sides. The Supreme Court of the
United States has recently held that a contract is still a contract, notwith-
standing the critical conditions caused by the war. Columbus Ry. P. & L.
Co. v. Columbus, (U. S. i919) 39 Sup. Ct. 349, (see 17 MIcE. L. Rzv. 689),
followed in Michigan Ry. Co. v. Lansing, (ig9g) 26o Fed. 322. Though the
German steamship company may have been justified in turning back and fail-
ing to carry out its contract to deliver at Plymouth and Cherbourg gold
shipped on the Kronprinzessin Cecilie, since the imminent danger of capture
by a belligerent which would have ended possibility of performance excused
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performance entirely, Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. 13, yet this does not
affect the general principle "that if a party charge himself with an obligation
possible to be performed he must abde by it. unless performance is rendered
impossible by the act of God, the law, or the other party. Unforeseen diffi-
culties will not excuse performance." lb. The very essence of a contract is
that the contractor takes the risk within the limits of his undertaking. Day
v. U. S., 245 U. S. i59; North Hempstead v. Pub. Serv. Corp., 176 N. Y. S.
621. The courts cannot relieve nor make new contracts for the parties.
Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Muscatine, (1019) 256 Fed. 928.
In the Columbus case the terms of the franchise were clear, the fare to
be charged was explicitly stated, there was no room for interpretation.
Though the War Labor Board had granted a fifty per cent increase in wages
to the employees of the company, yet this was not an intervention by the
government as in Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co., [1918] A.
C. 119. A rise in the cost of labor is one of the risks. Indeed it is not
shown that the franchise would be unprofitable for the whole 25 years period.
Would it make a difference if it were shown? The company, then, could
not throw up its franchise and ask the aid of a court of equity to relieve it
from its hard bargain. The city, acting under state authority, had made the
contract and was bound by it. Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 2o6
U. S. 496. Can it be supposed that the company would have revised the
bargain in favor of the city if the advantages had been reversed? The com-
pany must be held equally bound though temporarily at least, the operation
of the lines must result in a loss. The remedy, if any be needed, addresses
itself to the duly constituted authorities. See also Moorhead v. Union L. H.
& P. Co.,'(x918) 255 Fed. 92o; Hillsdale Gaslight Co. v. Hillsdale, (i919)
258 Fed. 485.
During 1919 many rate disputes growing out of this high operating cost
have come to the couxts of last resort. Some may be noted which involve
contracts between the utility and the municipality which granted the fran-
chise to operate. In 17 Mxcn. L. Rgv. 429 attention was called to the un-
pleasant surprise the public was having in discovering that franchise rates
which had been upheld as fixed and binding against the public when in
favor of the utilities, were no longer fixed, but subject to revision up-
ward now that they were unprofitable and ruinous to the utilities. The
utilities have cried for relief to the public utilities commissions, the people's
own boards, and their cry is being heard, for experience shows that such
commissions are much more likely than the local authorities to grant at
least emergency relief. State v. Lewis, (Ind., xg18) 12o N. E. x2g; Otlumwa
Ry. & Light Co. v. Ottumwa. (Ia..,iQi9) 173 N. W. 270.
That a franchise between a municipality acting within its powers and
a utility corporation is a binding contract is still undoubted, law, North
Hempsteaa v. Pub. Serv. Corp. 176 N. Y. S. 621; Cleveland v. Cleveland City
Ry. Co., 194 0. S. 517; Interurban Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Coin., (Ohio,
1918) i2o N. E. 831; Muscatine Lighting Co. v. Muscatine, (xgig) 256 Fed.
929; Hillsdale Gaslight Co. v. Hillsdale, (1gg) 258 Fed. 485, but it is be-
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coming much clearer how often the city in assuming to fix rates has acted
without proper legislative authorization, Otturnwa Ry. & Light Co. v. Ot-
iurnwa, supra; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Cons., (Ga., i9i9)
98 S. E. 696; KalamazoQ v. Circuit Judge, (1918) 200 Mich. 146; San Air-
tonjo Public Serv. Co. v. San Antonio, (1919) 257 Fed. 467; Atlanta v.
Atlanta Gaslight Co., (Ga. igig) zoo S. E. 439; Winchester v. Winchester
Waterworks Co., (U. S. Adv. Ops., Jan. 5, i92O), and that such rates when
lawfully fixed are always subject to the police power of the state, which
cannot be surrendered, Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Corn., (gig) 176 N. Y. S. 147;
St. Louis v. Pub. Serv.. Co., (Mo., i918) 2o7 S. W. 799; Atlantic Coast
Electric Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Coi., (N. J., 1918) io4 At. 218; Inter-
urban Ry. Ca. v. Pub. Utilities Coin., (Ohio. ioi8) 12o N. E. 831; Salt Lake
City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah, 1918) 173 Pac. 556; Georgia Ry.
& Power Co. v. Railroad Corn., (Ga., i9i9) 98 S.. E. 696, and hence that in
all cases except where the people have restrained the legislature in the con-
stitution the rates fixed in the franchise, and which are binding as against
the city, may be raised by the legislature, Interurban Ry. Co. v. Puo. Utilities
Coin., supra, or by a public commission to which the legislature has clearly
committed such-.power. Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Cor., (i919) 176 N. Y. S.
147; State v. Lewis. (Ind., ioi8) i2o N. E. iso. This is nothing more than
to say that when the state through one of its minor subdivisions has made
a binding contract it has the power, with or without the consent of such
subdivision, to release the other party to the contract, even though it may
be admitted the other party would not release the state if the conditions
were reversed. This it does, not out of generosity, but because it regards
it as good public policy to have its public utilities in good financial con-
dition so as to insure good service. Just why the locality" more immediately
affected does not usually take this view of it is a study in psychology or
sociology rather than in law. Most of the cases show the cities trying to
prevent the commissions from hearing the cry of the utility, or granting relief.
Koehn v. Pub. Serv. Co., supra; Atlantic Coast Electric Railway Co. v. Pub.
Utility Co., (N. J., 1918) io4 AtI. 218; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Trac-
tion Co.. (Utah. m0x8) 173 Pac. .56; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad
Corn., (Ga., i919) 98 S. E. 696.
Such wad the case of International Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Corn., (ig9g) z26
N. Y. 474, which well illustrates how since 1917 the shoe pinches the foot of
the other wearer, and the city after putting it on is struggling to kick it off,
while the utility after trying to keep out of it is now eager to get in. In 1916
the city of Buffalo. claiming that the permitted fare was too high, petitioned
the Public Service Commission to fix a just and reasonable rate. For two
years the petition lay dormant. Then the company, claiming it was no longer
a question of lower rates, but a choice between higher rates and bankruptcy,
joined the now unwilling city in its forgotten prayer for a revision. The
Commission, siding with the city, refused to accept the unwelcome and long
delayed answer, but the Court of Appeals found the Commission must hear
the case. In Matter of Quinby v. Public Serv. Coin., 223 N. Y. 244, the court
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had held that in the absence of clear and definite language it would not be
assumed that the legislature had authorized the commission to annul con-
ditions imposed by local authorities, but the conditions in the Buffalo fran-
chise necessarily implied an agreement for revisions. The New York con.
stitution, like that of many other states, e. g., Missouri, St. Louis v. Pub.
Serv. CoM., 207 S. W. 799; and Utah, Salt Lake City v. Utah Light and Trac-
tion Co., 173 Pac. 556, forbids the construction or operation of a street rail-
road without the consent of the local authorities first obtained. This means
the consent may be conditioned on charging a named rate of fare, but it does
not remove beyond the control of the legislature in the exercise of its police
power a revision of the rate so agreed upon. People ex rel. Glen Falls v.
Pub. Serv. Cor., 225 N. Y. 216. Whether the municipality might revoke its
consent if the legislature should raise the rate was left open in that case, and
again in the recent case of International Ry. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Com., 226 N.
Y. 474, but apparently the New York Legislature has given to the Commis-
sion all the power it had over rates not already fixed by statute, Niagara Falls
v. Pub. Ser. Com.. 177 N. Y. S. 861 (Sept:. i10x). or by legislative sanction
equivalent to a statute, Quinby v. Pub. Ser,. Com., 223 N. Y. 244; Koehn v.
Pub. Serv. Corn., x76 N. Y. S. 147. In those cases even though the statutory
rate might be confiscatory the Commission is not endowed with power to
so adjudge. They are outside its jurisdictioni. People ex rel. Gas Co. of
Albany v. Pub. Seer. Com., 224 N. Y. 156. Compare Maine cases appearing
since this note was written: In re Guilford Water Co's. Rates, io8 Atl. 446;
In re Searsport Water Co., Ibid. 452; In re Island Falls Water Co., Ibid. 459.
There is no longer any doubt that in general as against the municipality
reasonable rates fixed by contract between the municipality and the utility
are liable to be superceded by rates fixed by the legislature in the exercise
of its police power, or by a commission under legislative authority clearly
conferred. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U. S.
372 (1919). From this it often results that franchise rates cannot be changed
as against the utility, because it would amount to impairingthe obligation of a
contract, but they may be changed by the legislature as against the munici-
pality because the municipality is a subordinate division of the stAte and is
always subject to the legislative power, except as restrained by the con-
stitution. Interurban Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Corn., (Ohio, 9I18) 12o N. E.
831; Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., (Utah, sgi8) 173 Pac.
556; Englewovd v. Denver & So. Platt Ry. Co.. 248 U. S. 294 (iig), followed
in Black v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., (La., xgig) 82 So. 81, refusing
remedy in such a case to a citizen taxpayer; State v. Lewis, (Ind., 1918) 120
N. E. i29. But certainly if the statutes leave with the municipalities the
power to fix rates they may enter into mutually binding contracts with refer.
ence thereto, and a recent case holds that- when such a contract is once entered
into the city as well as the company is protected against a change even by the
legislature by reason of the Federal Constitutional prohibition against any
state passing a law impairing the obligation of a contract. Cincinnati v.
Pub. Utility Com. (Ohio, i9x8) 121 N. E. 688. As to the municipality this
may be doubted, and Jones, J., in dissenting points out that municipalities
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are political subdivisions of the state, and mere agents subject to the power
of the state to change its regulations. It would seem that only a constitu-
tional provision could restrain the legislature. State v. Lewis, (Ind., 1918)
12o N. E. 129; Westinghouse Electrical & Mfg. Co. v. Binghampton Ry. Co.,
(1919) 255 Fed. 378, 408. In such case it gets its power, not from the
legislature, but from the people and the municipality is then, of course, beyond
the reach of the legislature. Interurban Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Corn., (Ohio,
i918) 120 N. R. 831.
What utilities will do that find themselves headed for bankruptcy and
denied increase over franchise rates does not fully appear. They may try
coercion by refusal to operate, as in Toledo and some other places, but so
far as the courts are concerned it seems clear they cannot grant relief, even
by establishing a receivership. The receiver must operate under the con-
tract. Westinghouse Electrical & Mfg. Co. v. Binghampton Ry. Co., supra.
North American Construction Co. v. Des Moines City Ry. Co., (1919) 256
Fed. r07, in which the court suggests that if it is a question of a raise in rates
or of a poorer service the class of service must yield rather than the rates.
But what right can there be to yield either? It may be bad public policy to
insist on such hard bargains against public utilities, but.public policy addresses
itself to the legislatures, not to the courts. Muescatine Light Co. v. Muscatine,
(ioig) 256 Fed. 929, Ottumwa Ry. & Light Co. v. Ottumwa, (Ia., 1919) I73
N. W. 27o. See also Pub. Utilities Com. v. Rhode Island Co., (R. I., 1919)
bo7 AtI. "87r, io8 Atl. 66, Michigan Ry. Co. v. Lansing, (i91g) 26o Fed. 322.
Both the utilities and the public should learn that their interests are largely
mutual, and that it may be neither just nor safe to insist on tak;ng all the
advantages of a hard bargain. No one can tell when conditions may reverse
advantages. . C. G.
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